Hyper-Chaos, Thermospasm and Aion: On the Temporal Philosophies of Meillassoux, Land and Deleuze


“Time is not governed by physical laws because it is the laws itself that are governed by mad Time.”.– Quentin Meillassoux

“The thermospasm is reality as undiluted chaos. It is where we all
came from.”
– Nick Land

“Aion is the eternal truth of time: pure empty form of time, which has freed itself of its present corporeal content and has thereby unwound its own circle, stretching itself out into a straight line.” – Gilles Deleuze

“The Real – the over-abundant obscene-morbid vitality of
the primordial…” – Slavoj Zizek

“The reason why time plays a great part in so many of my tales is that this element looms up in my mind as the most profoundly dramatic and grimly terrible thing in the universe. Conflict with time seems to me the most potent and fruitful theme in all human expression.” – H.P. Lovecraft

In this post I want to bring together the notions of time in Gilles Deleuze, Nick Land, and Quentin Meillassoux: Aion, Thermospasm, and Hyper-Chaos. Even Slavoj Zizek whose horror of the Real and disgust of the Flesh involve him in a strange and ironic dialectical battle against this hyper-chaotic time world shows his acknowledgement of its effects even as he tries to transcend its dark secrets. I’ll see these through the lens of the holographic principle as suggested in a previous post.

Now if we go back to my previous post The Holographic Universe: Black Holes, Information, and the Mathematics where the notion of the  ‘holographic principle,’ the idea that a universe with gravity can be described by a quantum field theory in fewer dimensions, has been used for years as a mathematical tool in strange curved spaces. New results suggest that the holographic principle also holds in flat spaces. Our own universe could in fact be two dimensional and only appear three dimensional — just like a hologram. The notion that our visible universe is a projection from a 2 dimensional surface or flat horizon of information in mathematical terms then we might apply this to the Aion/Chronos forms of time with Land’s Thermospasm and Meillassoux’s Hyper-Chaos time to give a expanded picture of what is going on.

Deleuze’s Aion, Land’s Thermospasm, and Meillassoux’s Hyper-chaos are tropes (descriptions) referencing this 2 dimensional holographic principle of which our present time – Chronos, etc. are the 3 dimensional projection of the holographic time-dimension. Against any confusion with the Platonic notion of something outside the universe (realm of Ideas, etc.) the sciences seem to be in agreement with these forms of philosophical speculation in the sense that we’re entangled (quantum physics) in layers of reality rather than exposed to some inside/outside incorporation of a theological divine world of Ideas. This sense of intra-dimensional movement, process, becoming rather than horizons of presence/absence, inside/outside tropes is becoming more and more prevalent in mathematical physics and in philosophy of materialism. Ultimately philosophy will give way to science in this endeavor in my opinion. Philosophy has become ill-suited to the task of description in its linguistic phase, yet will probably remain the best tool for a heuristic device in conveying information for educational and social mentation available for non-mathematicians. There are even debates among quantum physicists as to whether mathematical description will ever be able to describe facets of this extreme terrain as well (i.e., the principle of uncertainty or indetermination, etc.).

Yet, this essay is about the philosophical not scientific quest to describe this strange noumenal time-system underlying our phenomenal universe. We’re dealing with temporal descriptions, linguistic descriptions, that Meillassoux hopes to prove through mathematical description at some future point. Ultimately this is about temporality, time, complexity and information. It’s a universe in which Being is an effect of this 2 dimensional projection from the thermospasm, hyper-chaos, or Aeon time-dimensions. Or to put it in other terms following Land, Meillassoux and Deleuze: It’s about the composition of the universe out of thermospasm, Aeon, or hyper-chaos; a libidinal energetics that composes being as processual forms of chaotic and immanent effects that we apprehend as the universe around us. For Land it the mazings of the 3 dimensional Chronos time or the present eventually leads back by circuitous route to the 2 dimensional mad time of the pre-ontological surface. Eternal recurrence is this movement between the 2 dimensional hyper-chaos into the 3 dimensional present (Chronos) of our universe and back again. A cyclic or spiraling image of cosmology as process. (One could bring in Whitehead and many others…)

Zizek will acknowledge it as Deleuze’s realm of the Virtual:

So, to conclude, if we return from the second to the first part of Parmenides, i.e., to the status of Ideas, then the result should be that Ideas do not exist, do not have ontological reality of their own: they persist as purely virtual points of reference. That is to say, the only appropriate conclusion is that eternal Ideas are Ones and Others which do not participate in (spatio-temporal) Being (which is the only actual being there is): their status is purely virtual. This virtual status was made clear by Deleuze, one of the great anti-Platonists. Deleuze’s notion of the Virtual is to be opposed to the all-pervasive topic of virtual reality: what matters to Deleuze is not virtual reality, but the reality of the virtual (which, in Lacanian terms, is the Real). Virtual Reality in itself is a rather miserable idea: that of imitating reality, of reproducing experience in an artificial medium. The reality of the Virtual, on the other hand, stands for the reality of the Virtual as such, for its real effects and consequences. ( Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (Kindle Locations 1738-1746). Norton. Kindle Edition.)

This sense of the virtual ‘as such’ of the Aion time-dimension out of which forms (Ideas) are composed into being as effects rather than causes (Lacan’s Real). It’s as if Zizek sees it through a glass darkly but just want quite give up his dialectical notions, his need for transcendence rather than immanence, his Subject as Substance, etc.. Zizek is a philosopher of ‘fixity’ instead of pure process, who moves between substance and subject rather than following the trail back into the Real. His is a philosophy of disgust, a wavering among the realms of the for itself. He casts a wary eye upon the likes of Land, Meillassoux, and Deleuze for their anti-metaphysical materialisms. So we will not follow Zizek into the labyrinths of transcendental dialectic but instead enter the mazings of non-dialectical materialism in Land, Meillassoux and Deleuze as they discover the hyper-chaotic realms of mad time…

libidinal materialism and speculative materialism

Nick Land will point out the basic premise of ‘libidinal materialism’ as being outside the probabilistic universe of thermodynamics because of the simple fact that “libidinal energy is chaotic, and pre-ontological” (p. 43).1 Against the laws of thermodynamics which is situated in an ontology of energy, of particles (Boltzmann), of space/time, and then interprets distributions and entropy levels as attributes of energy, libidinal materialism accepts only chaos and composition (p. 43). I’ll refer the reader to a previous post on Land’s materialism: The Curse of the Sun: Libidinal Materialism as the Composition of the Universe for a more in depth study. In such a world Being is an effect of chaos rather than something that exists in-itself.

Libidinal materialism he calls it: thematically ‘psychoanalytic’, methodologically “genealogical, diagnostic, and enthusiastic for the accentuation of intensity that will carry it through insurrection into anegoic delirium. Stylistically it is aggressive, only a little sub hyperbolic, and—above all—massively irresponsible…” (TA: 14). A voyager in dissolution, a decadent hyperpilot of a psychedelic finitude, a scientist of strange days he tells us that no “one could ever ‘be’ a libidinal materialist. This is a ‘doctrine’ that can only be suffered as an abomination, a jangling of the nerves, a combustion of articulate reason, and a nauseating rage of thought. It is a hyperlepsy of the central nervous-system, ruining the body’s adaptive regimes, and consuming its reserves in rhythmic convulsions that are not only futile, but devastating” (TA: 14).

Nick Land will term hyper-chaos differently, saying: “The thermospasm is reality as undiluted chaos. It is where we all came from. The death-drive is the longing to return there, just as salmon would return upstream to perish at the origin. Thermospasm is howl, annihilating intensity, a peak of improbability.” (p. 43) Meillossoux too will affirm such an anti-metaphysical gesture, stating that all metaphysics seeks to establish reasons, to fix substance and Idea, to bind being and becoming to laws and necessities. While both libidinal materialism and speculative materialism situate themselves outside of all metaphysics in a time “that is so completely liberated from metaphysical necessity that nothing constrains it: neither becoming, nor substratum” (Meillassoux, KL 341). As he’ll remind us hyper-chaotic time “is able to create and destroy even becoming, producing without reason fixity or movement, repetition or creation” (KL 342).

Time without becoming

What I want to do now is expand on Quentin Meillassoux’s  Time without Becoming. His speculative materialism set out to understand how something or someone could think reality independent of a subject, and do this without returning to any pre-critical or naïve realism. He starts out telling us:

The entire effort of modern philosophy was to do without the concept of truth, or, according to me, and more interestingly, to fundamentally redefine this concept, replacing truth as adequation with truth considered as legality (Kant), or intersubjectivity (Husserl), or interpretation (hermeneutics). But what I try to show in After Finitude is that there is in ancestrality a strange resistance to every anti-adequation model. Yet this resistance doesn’t directly concern the truth of scientific theories, but rather their meaning.1

We know that modern quantum mechanics with its principle of uncertainty or indetermination is situated within this ‘adequation’ model of testability based on probabilistic or statistical mathematics. Notions of adequation or correspondence theories of truth go back to Thomas Aquinas: Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus (“Truth is the adequation of things and intellect”), a statement which Aquinas attributed to the ninth century neoplatonist Isaac Israeli. Aquinas also restated the theory as: “A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality”.

Meillassoux will refine his argument asking “what is nature without man, and how can we think the time in which nature has produced the subject, or Dasein?” (KL 154) This is to ask the simple question: How can we think of a time before man, or even ask what the conditions must have been to bring such a subject as we are into being? This is the Kantian trick of correlationism:

Correlationism takes many contemporary forms, but particularly those of transcendental philosophy, the varieties of phenomenology, and post-modernism. But although these currents are all extraordinarily varied in themselves, they all share, according to me, a more or less explicit decision: that there are no objects, no events, no laws, no beings which are not always already correlated with a point of view, with a subjective access. (KL 37)

So that his whole goal in his early work After Finitude was an attempt to refute every form of correlationism – which is to say that he tries to demonstrate that thinking, under very special conditions, can access reality as it is in itself, independently of any act of subjectivity. (KL 80) This is where his problem of ancestrality is brought into play, and will be resolved by his interjection of a new concept he terms the principle of factiality (“ principe de factualité” en français). (KL 87)

So he’ll start with a simple question: what are the conditions of possibility of ancestral statements? (KL 95) Which is defined as a statement about a time preceding the subject, or consciousness, a time within which subjectivity or being-in-the-world itself emerged, and which perhaps will disappear along with humanity and terrestrial life. If we are bound by the Kantian correlational circle of thinking external reality or even the past as being bound to the notion of “for us”, then if time is a correlate of the subject, then nothing can actually precede the subject – as individual or more radically as human species – inside time. Which is an absurdity, but how to prove this? How to prove that one can develop scientific description, mathematical or otherwise that will provide statements about temporal events that happened before humans even existed: a world without us?

To do this he states that we will need to redefine correspondence, to find a very different concept of adequation, if we are serious about rejecting correlationism in all its power. Because what we will discover outside the correlation is very different from the naïve concepts of things, properties and relations. It is a reality very different from given reality. (KL 192)

Kant and those that followed him would be bound to a dualism of subject and phenomena (rejecting that noumenal reality could even be observed or correlated). Ultimately what Kant tried to do was overcome the dogmatic absolutism of the pre-critical philosophers: Spinoza, Leibniz, and Descartes rationalist arguments for the knowledge of an absolute. As Meillassoux will state correlationism claims “that we are locked up in our representations – conscious, linguistic, historical ones – without any sure means of access to an eternal reality independent of our specific point of view.” (KL 207)

For the dogmatic rationalists there were two paths: first, the notion of an absolute reality that exists outside the subject thinking (naïve realism); and, second, that there is not independent reality but that what we observe is only an Idea in the mind of the subject, and this, and this alone is real (Idealism). Meillassoux reports that both of these will need to be refuted if speculative materialism is to succeed.

Against any form of absolute that would provide either an absolute ground or necessity for the laws of reality, or for the absolute laws of mind (Ideas) he intervenes with ‘facticity’:

I call “facticity” the absence of reason for any reality; in other words, the impossibility of providing an ultimate ground for the existence of any being. We can only attain conditional necessity, never absolute necessity. If definite causes and physical laws are posited, then we can claim that a determined effect must follow. But we shall never find a ground for these laws and causes, except eventually other ungrounded causes and laws: there is no ultimate cause, nor ultimate law, that is to say, a cause or a law including the ground of its own existence. (KL 230-234)

In other words we are in an infinite regress if we try to discover in stable ground or absolute cause or law. There is none. Contrafactually he will argue that once we take away the ground or absolute we enter the terrain of contingency, a realm of unreason that “becomes the attribute of an absolute time capable of destroying or creating any determinate entity without any reason for its creation or destruction” (KL 262). Because of this he’ll argue that everything can be conceived of as contingent, depending on human tropism, everything except contingency itself. Contingency, and only contingency, is absolutely necessary: facticity, and only facticity, is not factual, but eternal. Facticity is not a fact, it is not one more fact in the world. And this is based upon a precise argument: I can’t be skeptical towards the operator for every skepticism. (KL 272-275)

This will bring him to the second principle of factiality. Factiality is not facticity, but the necessity of facticity, the essence of facticity. And the principle which enounces the factiality, he’ll simply call “the principle of factiality”. Finally, he calls “spéculation factuale”, “factial speculation”, the speculation grounded on the principle of factiality. Through the principle of factiality, he’ll maintain that he can attain a speculative materialism which clearly refutes correlationism. He can think an X independent of any thinking: and he knows this, thanks to the correlationist himself and his fight against the absolute. The principle of factiality unveils the ontological truth hidden beneath the radical skepticism of modern philosophy, to be is not to be a correlate, but to be a fact, to be is to be factual, and this is not a fact. (KL 276-282)

This is where it begins to get interesting. He’ll ask: What is facticity once it is considered an absolute rather than as a limit? His answer: time, but a very special kind of time, one he’ll term “hyper-chaos”. This is where he seems to touch base with Nick Land. Land speaks of chaos that is pre-ontological, not the chaos of thermodynamics and Being but a realm outside that cannot be distinguished between energy and power, or between negentropy and energy – this is not part of the thermodynamic universe but what brings that into existence. Meillassoux will define his “hyper-chaos” as neither physical (ontological) nor ordinary chaos (complexity); rather, instead of the usual chaos of disorder, randomness, and eternal becoming of objects, entities, things this is a realm he defines as “supercontingency” in which like the subatomic realm there is no end to the warring elements, no ground or fixity.

Against Heraclitus who he terms a philosopher of “fixity”, Meillassoux will argue instead that nothing is fixed everything is in flux, there are no laws underpinning things, only the contingency of facts not necessity: becoming is a fact without necessity or law; or, even reason. He admits to being a rationalist, and that reason cannot demonstrate the necessity of laws. Instead of demonstration we should accept laws as facts not arguments of necessity, and that facts are contingent not necessary; and, facts can change without reason at anytime.

Whitehead against chaos – process and reality

The secrets of the hoary deep, a dark Illimitable ocean, without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breadth and highth,
And time and place are lost; where eldest Night 
And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold Eternal anarchy amidst the noise
Of endless wars, and by confusion stand.

 – John Milton, Paradise Lost

Whitehead, Alfred North (2010-05-11). Process and Reality (Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28) (p. 96). Simon & Schuster, Inc.. Kindle Edition.

Alfred North Whitehead is a good example of a modern philosopher of fixity. In Process and Reality he’ll define his philosophy as being “governed by stubborn fact”:

The aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cosmology based upon the notions of ‘system,’ ‘process,’ ‘creative advance into novelty,’ ‘res vera’ (in Descartes’ sense), ‘stubborn fact,’ ‘individual unity of experience,’ ‘feeling,’ ‘time as perpetual perishing,’ ‘endurance as re-creation,’ ‘purpose,’ ‘universals as forms of definiteness,’ ‘particulars— i.e., rēs verae— as ultimate agents of stubborn fact.’ …

In the philosophy of organism it is held that the notion of ‘organism’ has two meanings, interconnected but intellectually separable, namely, the microscopic meaning and the macroscopic meaning. The microscopic meaning is concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion, considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience. The macroscopic meaning is concerned with the givenness of the actual world, considered as the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides opportunity for the actual occasion. The canalization of the creative urge, exemplified in its massive reproduction of social nexūs, is for common sense the final illustration of the power of stubborn fact.4

Whitehead’s is a philosophy constructed against the transience of time and the fading of organic consciousness. “Each new epoch enters upon its career by waging unrelenting war upon the aesthetic gods of its immediate predecessor. Yet the culminating fact of conscious, rational life refuses to conceive itself as a transient enjoyment, transiently useful. In the order of the physical world its rôle is defined by its introduction of novelty. But, just as physical feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of causality, so the higher intellectual feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck: ‘There shall be no more sea.’” (p. 340) What he sought was the exact opposite of hyper-chaos and perpetual change, instead he would follow the realm of timelessness and the unchanging world of fixity: “The perfect realization is not merely the exemplification of what in abstraction is timeless. It does more: it implants timelessness on what in its essence is passing. The perfect moment is fadeless in the lapse of time. Time has then lost its character of ‘perpetual perishing’; it becomes the ‘moving image of eternity.’” (p. 338)

So Whitehead offers us only the sad glimpse of a dying universe, the entropic passing of organic into inorganic zero. For Whitehead the only conclusion was theological:

The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible. (p. 111)

… We find here the final application of the doctrine of objective immortality. Throughout the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal Creature, the inward source of distaste or of refreshment, the judge arising out of the very nature of things, redeemer or goddess of mischief, is the transformation of Itself, everlasting in the Being of God. In this way, the insistent craving is justified— the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for evermore. (p. 352)

So for Whitehead there is the objective immortality of process and change as fixity, of a realm of novelty that continues to churn away in the perpetual motion schema of a universe that revolves within the immanence of God.

We will leave Whitehead to his God and return to the mad time of Deleuze’s Aion…

Zizek’s disgust and the real of Aion (Deleuze)

“Time is not governed by physical laws because it is the laws itself that are governed by mad Time.” (Meillassoux, KL 333)

Strangely we might also bring in Zizek who – though being a follower of Hegel/Lacan, brings in the idea of the Real:

The Real we are dealing with here is the Real of the pure virtual surface, the “incorporeal” Real, which is to be opposed to the Real in its most terrifying imaginary dimension, the primordial abyss which swallows up everything, dissolving all identities— a figure well known in literature in multiple guises, from Edgar Allan Poe’s maelstrom and Kurtz’s “horror” at the end of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, to Pip from Melville’s Moby Dick who, cast to the bottom of the ocean, experiences the demon God:

Carried down alive to wondrous depths, where strange shapes of the unwarped primal world glided to and fro before his passive eyes … Pip saw the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects, that out of the firmament of waters heaved the colossal orbs. He saw God’s foot upon the treadle of the loom, and spoke to it; and therefore his shipmates called him mad.3

This Real (whose best-known Freudian case is the dreamer’s look into Irma’s throat from Traumdeutung), this over-abundant obscene-morbid vitality of the primordial Flesh, is not the Real of pure appearance which is the truth of the Platonic Idea. It is again Deleuze who can help us draw a clearer line of distinction between these two Reals. On the very first page of his Logic of Sense, Deleuze describes pure becoming with a reference to Alice in Wonderland: when Alice “becomes larger,”

she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once: Alice does not grow without shrinking, and vice versa. (Zizek, KL 1588-1592)

Deleuze introduces here the opposition between two modes of time, Chronos (the time of bodily substances) and Aion (the time of immaterial becoming): the cyclic time of material transformations, of the generation and corruption of things— which is, at its most basic level, the “terrifying, measureless present” of the primordial Chaos— and the pure linearity of the flux of becoming. In Chronos, “only the present exists in time. Past, present and future are not three dimensions of time; only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to the present in time.”  This Now of Chronos should be opposed to the Instant of Aion:

In accordance with Aion, only the past and future inhere or subsist in time. Instead of a present which absorbs the past and future, a future and past divide the present at every instant and subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at once. Or, rather, it is the instant without thickness and without extension, which subdivides each present into past and future, rather than vast and thick presents which comprehend both future and past in relation to one another.

Whereas Chronos was inseparable from circularity and its accidents— such as blockages or precipitations, explosions, disconnections, and indurations— Aion stretches out in a straight line, limitless in either direction. Always already passed and eternally yet to come, Aion is the eternal truth of time: pure empty form of time, which has freed itself of its present corporeal content and has thereby unwound its own circle, stretching itself out into a straight line.(Zizek, KL 1615-1627)

Principle of reason no longer applies

Meillassoux knows that he has destroyed the correlational argument of the principle of reason and fixity, but in doing so he has also uncovered a flaw – he has at the same time undermined the very foundations of scientific truth. What to do? If there is no rational structure of being, if the ‘principle of reason’ upon which science is founded is no longer valid then what will replace it?

He’ll tell us his thesis: he thinks there are specific conditions of facticity, which he calls “figures”: by this he means, facticity is for him the only necessity of things but to be factual implies not to be just anything. To be factual is not given just to any sort of thing. Some things, if they existed, wouldn’t obey the strict and necessary conditions for being a factual entity. That’s why these things can’t exist: they can’t exist, because if they existed, they would be necessary, and to be necessary, according to the principle of factuality, is impossible. (Meillassoux, KL 352)

Ultimately this notion of a mad time, of hyper-chaos rests on the principle of non-contradiction: it is because the metaphysical principle of reason is absolutely false, that the logical principle of non-contradiction is absolutely true. (Meillassoux, KL 353) “The perfect  “logicity” of everything is a strict condition of the absolute absence of reason for anything.” (Meillassoux, KL 356) This is why for him metaphysics is dead, mute: because metaphysics always believes, in one way or the other, in the “principle of reason” (Meillassoux, KL 357).

One issue that he has yet to resolve he states as follows: Would it be possible to derive, to draw from the principle of facitality, the ability of the natural sciences to know, by way of mathematical discourse, reality in itself, by which I mean our world, the factual world as it is actually produced by Hyper-chaos, and which exists independently of our subjectivity? This is his future project, and will also resolve the ancestral problem that has yet to be resolved.

The catastrophe of time

Land following Bataille will remark that no “ontology of time is possible, and yet ontology remains the sole foundation for discursive accomplishment. There are only the shattered spars and parodies of philosophy, as ruinous time pounds thought into the embers of an unwitting sacrifice, wreathed in a laughter as cold and nakedly joyous as the void.” (Land, p. 95) Here Land admits the foundations of philosophy that rest on the principle of reason are sacrificed upon the shores of hyper-chaos, mad time. As Land will affirm Time, mad Time is the “ocean of immanence, from which nothing can separate itself, and in which everything loses itself irremediably. … The thought that matter is not a content of time is perhaps the preeminent shadow of a truth that is ‘at once’ an impossibility and an abomination (also an ecstasy). (p. 95)”. For Land all the metaphysicians, Kant and his progeny are nothing more than priests in academic trappings, that what we’ve been led to believe is in a synchronous, book-keeping, work-a-day time-world of fixity, bound to the principle of reason and contradiction. But under it all is the hideous truth of Aeon, the hyper-chaotic cesspool of energetic time that knows not the order of reasons – nor the “imperative rationality of the divine” (p. 97). We are moving inexorably into the accumulated time of the Aeon where what “is dammed up in the Aeon is the densely material time of rupture and ruthless re-creation…” (p. 97). Ultimately against the metaphysicians and any principle of reason Land offers

“Nature, far from being logical, ‘is perhaps entirely the excess of itself’, smeared ash and flame upon zero, and zero is immense.” (p. 104)

  1. Meillassoux, Quentin (2014-12-10). Time without Becoming (Kindle Locations 169-173). Mimesis International. Kindle Edition.
  2. Nick Land. A Thirst For Annihilation. (Routledge, 1992)
  3. Zizek, Slavoj (2012-04-30). Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (Kindle Locations 1579-1581). Norton. Kindle Edition.
  4. Whitehead, Alfred North (2010-05-11). Process and Reality (Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28) (p. 128). Simon & Schuster, Inc.. Kindle Edition.

2 thoughts on “Hyper-Chaos, Thermospasm and Aion: On the Temporal Philosophies of Meillassoux, Land and Deleuze

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